We study under what conditions the conjectured one-wayness of the knapsack function (with polynomially bounded inputs) over an arbitrary finite abelian group implies that the output of the function is pseudorandom, i.e., computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen group element. Previous work of Impagliazzo and Naor (J. Cryptology 9(4): [199][200][201][202][203][204][205][206][207][208][209][210][211][212][213][214][215][216] 1996) considers only specific families of finite abelian groups and uniformly chosen random binary inputs. Our work substantially extends previous results and provides a much more general reduction that applies to arbitrary finite abelian groups and input distributions with polynomially bounded coefficients. As an application of the new result, we give sample preserving search-to-decision reductions for the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev (J. ACM 56(6):34, 2009) and widely used in lattice-based cryptography.
Introduction
The Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev in [38] , is the problem of recovering a secret n-dimensional integer vector s ∈ Z n q , given a collection of perturbed random equations a i s ≈ b i where a i ∈ Z n q is chosen uniformly at random and b i = a i s + e i for some small, randomly chosen error term e i . In recent years, LWE has been used to substantially expand the scope of lattice based cryptography, yielding solutions to many important cryptographic tasks, including public key encryption secure against passive [38, 24, 36] and active attacks [37, 35] , (hierarchical) identity based encryption [17, 12, 1, 2] , digital signatures [17, 12] , oblivious transfer protocols [36] , several forms of leakage resilient encryption [5, 6, 13, 20] , (fully) homomorphic encryption [16, 15, 11] and more. The versatility of the LWE problem in the construction of a plethora of cryptographic applications is due in large part to its pseudorandomness properties: as proved in [38] , if recovering (with high 1 probability) the secret s from the samples (a i , a i s + e i ) is computationally hard, then it is also hard to distinguish the LWE samples (a i , a i s + e i ) from randomly chosen ones (a i , b i ) where the b i ∈ Z q are uniformly and independently distributed. In other words, any efficient distinguisher (between the LWE and the uniform distributions) can be turned into an inverter that recovers the secret s, with only a polynomial slow-down.
On the theoretical side, cryptography based on LWE is supported by deep worst-case/average-case connections [38, 35] , showing that any algorithm that solves LWE (on the average) can be efficiently converted into a (quantum) algorithm that solves the hardest (worst-case) instances of several famous lattice approximation problems which are believed to be intractable, like approximating the minimum distance of a lattice within factors that grow polynomially in the dimension, and various other related problems [27] . It should be remarked that, while such proofs of security based on worst-case lattice assumptions provide a solid theoretical justification for the probability distributions used in LWE cryptography, they are quite loose in their parameter settings. As a result, these reductions are hardly useful in practice, and in order to get meaningful estimates on the hardness of breaking LWE cryptography, it is generally more useful and appropriate to conjecture the average-case hardness of solving LWE, and use that as a starting point. (See [29, pp. 446-450] for a discussion of this and related issues.) In fact, all recent work aimed at determining appropriate key sizes and security parameters [33, 26, 40] follows this approach, and investigates experimentally the concrete hardness of solving LWE on the average.
In light of that, LWE is best formulated as the problem of inverting the one-way function family (indexed by a random matrix A ∈ Z m×n q , where m is the number of samples) that maps the secret s ∈ Z n q and error vector e ∈ Z m q to As + e ∈ Z m q . The search-to-decision reduction of [38] shows that if the LWE function family is one-way, then it is also a good pseudorandom generator. However, the reduction in [38] somehow hides an important detail: the value of m for which the function is assumed to be one-way is much higher than (still polynomially related to) the value of m for which the pseudorandomness of the function's output is proven.
While theoretical results based on worst-case lattice problems are fairly insensitive to the value of m, (i.e., the number of samples used in the LWE instance,) this number becomes more important and relevant when considering concrete attacks on the average-case hardness of LWE. For instance, recent algorithmic results [8] show that, when the errors e i are sufficiently small, the LWE problem can be solved in subexponential (or even polynomial) time, provided a sufficiently large number of samples is available. Therefore, for certain ranges of the parameters, the number of available samples can have a significant impact on the computational hardness of the LWE problem. Likewise, some lattice attacks perform better in practice when given many (typically ω(n)) samples [33] . However, LWE-based encryption schemes (e.g., see [26] ) typically expose only a small number of samples (say, comparable to the dimension n of the LWE secret s) during key generation and encryption. Fixing the number of available samples to a small value may significantly reduce the effectiveness of attacks, and increase our confidence in the concrete security of the schemes.
It should also be noted that when the number of available samples is above a certain threshold, one can efficiently generate an arbitrary number of additional samples [17, 6, 39] , but at the cost of increasing the magnitude of the errors. So, for certain other ranges of the parameters the impact of increasing the number of samples may not be as critical as in [8] . Still, even in such situations, using a large number of samples comes at the price of lowering the quality of the samples, which can negatively impact the concrete security and performance of LWE-based cryptographic functions.
This motivates the following question: how big of a blow-up in the number of samples is required to prove the pseudorandomness of the LWE output distribution, based on the conjectured hardness of the LWE search (secret recovery) problem? The main result of this paper is that, perhaps surprisingly, in most common applications of LWE in cryptography, no such blow-up is necessary at all: there is a sample preserving reduction from solving the search LWE problem (with nonnegligible success probability) to the problem of distinguishing the LWE distribution from random (with nonnegligible advantage). At the core of our result is a general theorem about the pseudorandomness of bounded knapsacks over arbitrary groups that substantially extends previous work in the area and might be of independent interest.
Roadmap. In the next subsections, we give an informal overview of our results and techniques for bounded knapsack functions, and their application to the LWE problem. We review the background required in the rest of the paper in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the proof of our main technical result, the searchto-decision reduction for bounded knapsack families defined over arbitrary abelian groups. In Section 4, we describe applications of our main theorem to a broad range of bounded knapsack families, and explain how our result implies sample-preserving search-to-decision reductions for the LWE problem. We conclude in Section 5 with some interesting open problems.
Bounded Knapsacks over Abelian Groups
Let (G, +) be a finite abelian group, and g = (g 1 , . . . , g m ) ∈ G m a sequence of group elements chosen uniformly at random. The group elements g define a knapsack function f g (x) that maps the integer vector x ∈ Z m to the group element f g (x) = i x i g i . If the input x is restricted to vectors with small entries, then for a large variety of groups G, f g is conjectured to be a one-way function family, i.e., a family of functions that are hard to invert on average when the key g is chosen uniformly at random. For example, when the input x is restricted to the set {0, 1} m of binary vectors, inverting f g is the famous subset-sum problem, which is conjectured to be hard to solve on average, and has been extensively studied in cryptography. In a classic paper [22] , Impagliazzo and Naor showed that for some specific, but representative, choices of the group G, if the subset-sum function is one-way, then it is also a pseudorandom generator, i.e., it is computationally hard to distinguish (g, f g (x)) from a uniformly random element of G m+1 , when g ∈ G m and x ∈ {0, 1} m are chosen uniformly at random. We generalize the results of [22] in two respects:
• We consider functions over arbitrary finite groups G. Only groups of the form Z N were considered in [22] , and for two specific (but representative) choices of N (prime and power of 2).
• We consider input coefficients x i that take values from a set {0, . . . , s} (or, more generally {−s, . . . , s}) for any (polynomially bounded ) s. Moreover, we consider arbitrary input distributions. By contrast, the results in [22] hold for inputs x distributed uniformly with coefficients in {0, 1}.
Both extensions are essential for the sample-preserving search-to-decision LWE reduction presented in Section 4.2, which requires the pseudorandomness of the knapsack function over vector groups G = Z k q , and for inputs x following a nonuniform (Gaussian) distribution over a sufficiently large set {−s, . . . , s}. We remark that our generalization is nontrivial, as there are choices of the group G and input distribution, for which the bounded knapsack function is presumably one-way, but not pseudorandom. (See Lemma 4.1 for an example.) Our main technical result (Theorem 3.1) shows that for any finite abelian group G and input distribution X , the output of the knapsack function is pseudorandom provided the following two conditions hold:
1. f g is computationally hard to invert with respect to input distribution X , and 2. certain folded versions of f g (where both the key g and the output f g (x) are projected onto a quotient group
The second condition above may seem to make the statement in the theorem vacuous, as it asserts the pseudorandomness of f g assuming the pseudorandomness of (certain other versions of) f g . The power of the theorem comes from the fact that the quotient groups G d considered are very small. So small that for many interesting groups and input distributions the folded knapsack function f g (x) mod dG compresses the input (rather than stretching it) and produces an output which is statistically close to uniform. Therefore, for all such groups and input distributions, the one-wayness of the bounded knapsack function directly implies that knapsacks are good pseudorandom generators. Specific groups and input distributions for which this holds include:
• Groups whose order contains only large prime factors, larger than the maximum value of the input coefficients. Cyclic groups with prime order and vector groups Z k p for prime p fall into this category. This result generalizes those in [22] from uniform binary input to arbitrary input distributions.
• Distributions that, when folded (modulo small divisors of the order of G,) maintain high entropy relative to the size of the quotient group G/dG. (See Theorem 4.3.) Groups of the form G = Z k 2 and uniform input distribution over Z m 2 i for some i < satisfy this requirement. This last parameter set is a very attractive choice in practice since both group operations and input sampling are particularly efficient and easy to implement using arithmetic modulo powers of 2.
Pseudorandomness of the LWE Function
Our results for LWE are obtained using the duality between LWE and the knapsack function over vector groups 2 . Specifically, the LWE problem with secret vector s ∈ Z n q and m samples, can be shown to be essentially equivalent to the knapsack problem over the vector group Z m−n q when the input x ∈ Z m q follows the same distribution as the LWE error e. This duality is by no means new, and has been noticed and used in different settings [42, 30] . Here we observe that the duality holds both for the search and decision variants of both problems, so that search-to-decision reductions for the knapsack functions can be readily translated into corresponding sample-preserving search-to-decision reductions for LWE. As a corollary to our main theorem, we get search-to-decision reductions for the following interesting cases (among others):
• Binary modulus q = 2 and any error distribution. This directly proves the pseudorandomness of the well-known Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, as already established in [10, 7, 23] .
• Prime modulus q and any polynomially bounded error distribution.
• Prime power modulus q = p e for prime p = poly(n) large enough such that the error distribution is concentrated over {−(p − 1)/2, . . . , (p − 1)/2}.
• Prime power modulus q = p e for arbitrary (possibly small) prime p and uniform error distribution over
These results subsume (see below) several previous pseudorandomness results for LWE [38, 6] and LPN [23] but with an important difference. While the proofs in [38, 6, 23] require that LWE (resp. LPN) is hard to solve (invert) for a very large number of samples, our reductions are sample preserving: the pseudorandomness of LWE (resp. LPN) holds, provided the same problem is computationally hard to solve in its search version with the same number of samples 3 . We remark that previous results are often phrased as reductions from solving the LWE search problem with high probability, to solving the LWE decision problem with 2 We stretch that search LWE can be directly reduced (i.e. without exploiting the duality with the knapsack function) to its decision variant. Nevertheless, we still choose to use the aforementioned duality for the following reasons: i) our results for knapsack functions are much more general. Indeed, the LWE function family can be seen as the dual of the particular knapsack family where the underlying group is the vector group Z k q . ii) in the general case where Zq has composite order, i.e. q is composite, proving a direct search-to-decision reduction is no less technical than proving an indirect one (using the duality with knapsack families). iii) for some parameters, the direct reduction, unlike the indirect one, does not preserve the number of samples. One such example is when q is superpolynomial but the noise is polynomially bounded.
3 For LPN, a sample-preserving reduction was proved in [7] .
nonnegligible advantage, combining the search-to-decision reduction and success probability amplification into a single statement. By contrast, our reduction shows how to solve the LWE search problem with nonnegligible probability. Our results subsume previous work in the sense that the LWE search problem can be solved with high probability by first invoking our reduction, and then amplifying the success probability using standard repetition techniques. Of course, any such success probability amplification would naturally carry the cost of a higher sample complexity. We remark that a close inspection of worst-case to average-case reductions for LWE [38, 35] shows that these reductions directly support the conjecture that LWE is a strong one-way function, i.e., a function which is hard to invert even with just nonnegligible probability. As already discussed, worst-case to average-case reductions do not provide quantitatively interesting results, and are best used as qualitative arguments to support the conjecture that certain problems are computationally hard on average. Under the standard conjecture that search LWE is a strong one-way function, the results in this paper offer a fairly tight, and sample preserving proof that LWE is also a good pseudorandom generator, which can be efficiently used for the construction of many other lattice based cryptographic primitives. By contrast, it is not known how to take advantage of the strong one-wayness of LWE within previous searchto-decision reductions, resulting in a major degradation of the parameters. Of course, if we change the complexity assumption, and as a starting point we use the worst-case hardness of lattice problems or the assumption that LWE is only a weak one-way function, then our reduction will also necessarily incur a large blow up in sample complexity through amplification, and lead to quantitatively uninteresting results.
Preliminaries
We use Z, N, C for the sets of integer, natural and complex numbers respectively, and T for the set of complex numbers of unit magnitude. We use lower case for scalars, upper case for sets, bold lower case for vectors and bold upper case for matrices. We also use calligraphic letters for probability distributions and (possibly randomized) algorithms. For any s ∈ N, the set of the first s nonnegative integers is denoted [s] = {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}.
Probability
We write x ← X for the operation of selecting x according to a probability distribution X or by running probabilistic algorithm X . We use set comprehension notation to describe sets and probability distributions alike. E.g., {(x, x ) | x ← X , x ← X } denotes the probability distribution obtained by drawing two samples from X independently at random. For any probability distribution X over set X and any value x ∈ X, let Pr{x ← X } be the probability associated to x by distribution X . The uniform distribution over a set A is denoted U(A), and the support of a distribution X is denoted [X ] = {x ∈ X | Pr{x ← X } > 0}. The collision probability of X is the probability Col (X ) = Pr{x = x | x ← X , x ← X } = x∈[X ] Pr{x ← X } 2 that two independent identically distributed samples from X take the same value. The mode of X is the probability of the most likely value, i.e., mode (X ) = max x∈X Pr{x ← X }. It is easy to see that Col (X ) ≤ mode (X ).
Whenever we compare two probability distributions, we implicitly assume that they are defined over the same set. The statistical distance between distributions X and Y over the set X is the quantity ∆(X , Y) = 1 2 x∈X |Pr{x ← X } − Pr{x ← Y}|. The statistical distance is a metric over the set of discrete probability distributions, i.e., it is a symmetric positive function, and it satisfies the triangle inequality. It also satisfies
< for any probabilistic predicate D : X → {0, 1} (called the distinguisher ) computable in time at most t. Otherwise, we say that X , Y are (t, )-distinguishable. When Y = U(X) is the uniform distribution, we use ∆ U (X ) = ∆(X , U(X)) as an abbreviation and say that X is -random (resp. (t, )-pseudorandom) if it is -close to (resp. (t, )-indistinguishable from) U(X).
Function families. A function family (F, X ) is a collection F = {f i : X → R} i∈I of functions indexed by i ∈ I with common domain X and range R, together with a probability distribution X over the input set X ⊇ [X ]. For simplicity, in this paper we always assume that the set of functions is endowed with the uniform probability distribution U(F ), though the extension to general distributions (while not useful in this paper) is rather straightforward. Each function family (F, X ) naturally defines a probability distribution
obtained by selecting a function at random and evaluating it at a random input. A function family F = (F, X ) is called (t, )-one-way if for any (probabilistic) algorithm I running in time at most t, it holds Pr{f (x) = y | (f, y) ← F(F, X ), x ← I(f, y)} < . F is (t, )-invertible if there exists a (probabilistic) algorithm I running in time at most t such that Pr{f (x) = y | (f, y) ← F(F, X ), x ← I(f, y)} ≥ . We then say that I is a (t, )-inverter for F. A (t, )-pseudorandom generator family 4 is a function family (F, X ) such that the associated distribution F(F, X ) defined in (1) is (t, )-pseudorandom.
Asymptotics. We use n as a (security) parameter that controls all other parameters. Unless otherwise stated, any other parameter (say m) will be polynomially related to n, that is 1/n c1 ≤ m ≤ n c2 for some constants c 1 , c 2 . We use standard asymptotic notation O(·), Ω(·), o(·), ω(·), etc. We write negl(n) = n −ω (1) for the set of negligible functions and poly(n) = n O(1) for the set of polynomially bounded functions. In the asymptotic computational complexity setting, one often considers probability ensembles, i.e., sequences X = (X n ) n∈N of probability distributions over possibly different sets
The ensembles X and Y are computationally indistinguishable (denoted X ≈ Y) if X n and Y n are (t(n), (n))-indistinguishable for any t(n) = poly(n) and some (n) = negl(n) under a sequence (D n : X n → {0, 1}) n∈N of distinguishers computable in uniform polynomial time. Definitions for function families are also extended in the obvious way to function family ensembles F = (F n ) n in the asymptotic setting by taking (n) = negl(n) and t(n) = poly(n), and considering uniform sequences of distinguishing algorithms. In particular, a function family ensemble F = (F n ) n is one-way if F n is (t(n), (n))-one-way for any t(n) = poly(n) and some (n) = negl(n). It is pseudorandom if the associated distribution ensemble (1) is (t(n), (n))-pseudorandom, i.e., it is (t(n), (n))-indistinguishable from the uniform distribution U(F n × R n ) for any t(n) = poly(n) and some (n) = negl(n).
Groups and Knapsack Function Families.
In this work, by group we always mean finite abelian group. We use additive notation for groups; 0 G is the neutral element, |G| is the order (size) of G and M G is its exponent, i.e. the smallest positive integer e such that e · g = 0 G for all g ∈ G. We use the dot product notation x · y = i x i · y i both for the inner product of two vectors x, y ∈ R n with elements in a ring R, and also to take integer linear combinations x ∈ Z n of a vector y ∈ G n with elements in an additive group. For x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n and a ∈ R, we also define
For any group G and (positive) integer d, we use G d to denote the quotient group G/dG where dG is the subgroup {d · g g ∈ G}, in analogy with the usual notation Z d = Z/dZ for the group of integers modulo d. Likewise, for an element g ∈ G, we use g mod dG (or just g mod d) for the image of g under the natural homomorphism from G to G d . For any integer vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w r ) ∈ Z r , we write gcd G (w) = gcd(w 1 , . . . , w r , M G ) for the greatest common divisor of the elements of w and the group exponent. We recall that any finite abelian group G is isomorphic to
Lemma 2.1. For any group G, integer vector w ∈ Z r , and
Proof. Fix w ∈ Z r , and let d = gcd G (w). We want to analyze the probability distribution Knapsack Families. For any group G and input distribution X over Z m , the knapsack family K(G, X ) is the function family with input distribution X and set of functions
and defined as f g (x) = g · x ∈ G. Typically, the input distribution X = S m is given by m independent identically distributed samples (x 1 , . . . , x m ), chosen from some probability distribution S over a finite (and polynomially sized) subset of the integers [S] ⊂ Z. We will often use g instead of f g to describe a member function drawn from K(G, X ). When G, X are clear from the context we will simply write K. We often consider folded knapsack families K(G d , X ) over quotient groups G d . For brevity, when G and X are clear from the context, we will write
The following lemma shows that the distribution F(K d ) associated to a folded knapsack function family is closely related to the distribution
Lemma 2.2. For any knapsack function family K and integer d,
Proof. The lemma follows from the existence of two efficiently computable (randomized) transformations m, m that appropriately map distributions over
Since the transformations m and m are efficiently computable, they can also be used to turn any efficient distinguisher for F d (K) into an efficient distinguisher for F(K d ), and vice versa.
We will need the following variant of the Leftover Hash Lemma [21] , generalized to arbitrary abelian groups. The original Leftover Hash Lemma [21] , applies to any universal (or -universal) hash function family over arbitrary sets. Our version of the lemma is specific to knapsack functions, but relaxes the universality requirement. Lemma 2.3 (Leftover Hash Lemma, generalized). For any knapsack function family K = K(H, X ) over a finite abelian group H,
where
and d ranges over all divisors of the group exponent M H strictly greater than 1 (M H included).
Proof. Let Z be any distribution over a set Z. The following standard computation provides an upper bound on the statistical distance between Z and U(Z) in terms of the collision probability Col (Z) .
We bound Col (F(K)) as follows, where all probabilities are computed over the random choice of h, h ← K and x, y ← X :
It remains to compute Pr{h · (x − y) = 0}. For that, we condition on the value of d = gcd H (x − y) and use Lemma 2.1. Notice that since gcd
where we used that Pr{gcd (6) and (7), and using |H d |·|dH| = |H|, yields the bound in the lemma.
Lattices and Gaussian Distributions
Gaussian-like distributions play a central role in the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. For each sample (a, b = a · s + e), the distribution χ from which e is drawn, is usually a Gaussian-like distribution over the integers. Several (worst-case) lattice approximation problems can be reduced (under quantum or classic polynomial time reductions [38, 35] ) to LWE with Gaussian error distribution. Moreover, Gaussian noise is "LWE-complete" [39, 17] in the sense that LWE with non-Gaussian error distribution can be reduced to LWE where the error is distributed according to a wider Gaussian. Below, we focus on the discrete Gaussian distribution, i.e., the conditional distribution obtained restricting a normal real random variable to take integer values. We provide bounds on the collision probability of the discrete Gaussian distribution, and use the bounds to establish search-to-decision reductions for LWE. Similar results hold also for the discretized Gaussian distribution, i.e., the distribution obtained by rounding the output of a real Gaussian random variable to the closest integer. Statements and proofs for discretized Gaussians are virtually identical and hence omitted.
Discrete Gaussian. The Gaussian function ρ r,c : R m → R with center c and width r is defined as
The discrete Gaussian with parameters r, c over a countable set S ⊂ R m is the distribution D S,r,c that samples each element x ∈ S with probability
.
When the center c is omitted from the notation D S,r it is assumed to be the origin c = 0. We will be primarily interested in discrete Gaussians over the set of integer vectors S = Z m . For such set, the vectors x ∈ Z m sampled by D Z m ,r have each coordinate x i identically and independently distributed according to a 1-dimensional Gaussian, i.e.,
Lattices. A (full-rank) m-dimensional lattice is the set Λ of integer combinations of m linearly independent 
The integer lattice Z m contains all m-dimensional vectors with integer coefficients. It is easy to check that for any m, Z m is a self-dual lattice, that is (Z m ) * = Z m . Also det(Z m ) = 1 and λ i (Z m ) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , m. The Poisson Summation Formula implies that for any lattice Λ and real r > 0,
For any ∈ R + , the smoothing parameter η (Λ) [32] is the smallest r > 0 such that ρ 1/r (Λ * \ {0}) ≤ . We will use the following bounds.
Proposition 2.4 ([32, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 4.4]).
Let Λ be an m-dimensional lattice.
For any function
2. For any ∈ (0, 1), r ≥ η (Λ) and c ∈ R m , we have that ρ r,c (Λ)
For our search-to-decision reduction of LWE with discrete Gaussian error distribution, we also need to consider the folded
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the collision probability of this distribution. 
Proof. We first bound the mode of D Z,r mod d.
Using Poisson summation formula (9), we get ρ r (Z) = r · ρ 1/r (Z) ≥ r. For the numerator, we have
where the inequalities follow from Proposition 2.4 and the fact that r/d = ω( √ log n). This bound shows that D Z,r mod d is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Z d and therefore
Fourier Analysis and Learning
We have already mentioned that Fourier analysis and Gaussian distributions play an important role in basing the average-case hardness of LWE on worst-case lattice assumptions [38, 35] . In this paper, we also use Fourier analysis, but in a quite different way, closer to the use made of Fourier analysis in learning theory and in the complexity study of boolean functions. (E.g., see [25, 9, 34] .) In cryptography, two noteworthy examples that make a similar use of Fourier analysis are the Kushilevitz-Mansour [25] formulation of the proof of the Goldreich-Levin [18] hard-core predicate for any one-way function, and the proofs of hard-core predicates for several number-theoretic one-way functions by Akavia, Goldwasser and Safra [4] .
Below we review some basic facts from Fourier analysis focusing on the discrete Fourier transform over finite abelian groups. We restrict the presentation to what is needed and refer the interested reader to [3, 41] for more details.
Fourier Basics. Let H be a finite abelian group and h 1 , h 2 : H → C be functions from H to the complex numbers. The inner product of h 1 and h 2 is defined as
wherez is the complex conjugate of z ∈ C. The 2 -norm 5 and ∞ -norm of h are defined as
The set of characters of H (denoted char(H)) is the set of all the homomorphisms from H to the complex numbers of unit magnitude T,
The set char(H) with point-wise addition forms a group which is isomorphic to H. If H = Z k1 × . . . × Z k and α = (α 1 , ..., α ) ∈ H, then the character χ α : H → T associated to α is defined as
. . . ω α x k where ω ki = e i 2π k i is the k i -th primitive root of unity. We will be particularly interested in functions defined over vector groups
The Fourier transform of a function h : H → C is the function h : H → C defined as h(α) = h, χ α . The Fourier transform measures the correlation of h with the characters of H. The energy of a Fourier coefficient α is defined as its squared norm | h(α)| 2 , while the total energy of h is defined as
Learning Heavy Fourier Coefficients Let τ ∈ R, α ∈ H and h : H → C where H is a finite abelian group. Following the notation and terminology from [3] , we say that α is a τ -significant (or τ -heavy)
There exists a probabilistic algorithm (SFT ) that on input a threshold τ and given query access to a function h : H → C, returns all τ -heavy Fourier coefficients of h in time poly(log |H|, 1/τ, h ∞ ) with probability 6 at least 2/3.
For functions with range T as considered in this work, it is immediate to verify that h 2 = h ∞ = 1 and therefore (by Parseval's identity) α∈H | h(α)| 2 = 1. Among these functions, of particular interest are those whose Fourier spectrum contains coefficients with energy which is a noticeable fraction of the total energy of the function, i.e., there exists a character β ∈ H such that | h(β)| 2 ≥ 1 poly(log |H|) . In this context, Theorem 2.6 says that SFT , given query access to a function h : H → T, can find all its 1 poly(log |H|) -heavy Fourier coefficients in time polynomial in log |H|.
Pseudorandomness of Knapsack Functions
In this section we establish the connection between the search and decision problems associated to families of bounded knapsack functions. The following theorem summarizes our main result. m ⊂ Z m for some s = poly(n), m = poly(n), and G be a finite abelian group. If K = K(G, X ) is one-way and
Remark 3.2. Theorem 3.1 as well as all its implications (see Section 4) hold true even if X is defined over {a, . . . , b} m for a, b ∈ Z (or more generally over {a 1 , . . . , b 1 } × · · · × {a m , . . . , b m }) as long as the (maximum) size s = max i {b i −a i +1} of the intervals is polynomially bounded. Indeed, knapsack instances (g, f g (x)) with input x i ∈ {a i , a i + 1, . . . , b i } can be immediately reduced to instances (g, f g (y)) = (g, f g (x) − f g (a 1 , . . . , a m )) where
Also, all statements remain essentially unchanged for distributions X such that an input x ← X belongs to [s] m except with negligible probability even if X 's support is possibly larger than [s] m . For ease of exposition, we will omit dealing with these two technicalities in the rest of the paper.
We remark that for knapsack families K = K(G, X ) that stretch their input, Theorem 3.1 is an if and only if statement. Indeed, if K is pseudorandom, then so is K d for any d, because there is an efficiently computable regular transformation (g, g) → (g mod d, g mod d) that maps F(K) to F(K d ). Moreover, if K(G, X ) stretches the input (or, more specifically, if the range [F(K)] is sparse in G m × G,) then any inverter with noticeable success probability can be used as a distinguisher for F(K) in a straightforward way.
Proving the direction as stated in Theorem 3.1 is much more involved, and makes use of the intermediate notion of (un)predictability defined below. Informally, for any ∈ N, an -predictor for a function family (F, X ) with integer inputs [X ] ⊂ Z m is a weak form of inverter algorithm that on input a function f ∈ F , a target value f (x) and a query vector r ∈ Z m , attempts to recover the value of x · r (mod ), rather than producing the entire input x. Here is an auxiliary value, unrelated to the parameters of the knapsack function family, that describes the amount of information recovered by the weak inverter. Below we define two notions to measure the quality of a prediction: accuracy and bias. The first is probably the most natural notion, and directly measures the predictor's success probability. The second is more technical, and it is needed to use Fourier analytic techniques. For the special case of prime the two notions are closely related, as shown in Lemma 3.5. Definition 3.3. For any ∈ N and function family (F, X ) with domain [X ] ⊆ Z m , an -predictor for (F, X ) is a probabilistic algorithm P that on input (f, y, r) ∈ F × R × Z m outputs a value P(f, y, r) ∈ Z which is intended to be a guess for x · r (mod ). The error distribution of a predictor P is defined as
An -predictor P is (t, )-accurate if it runs in time t and Pr{0 ← E (P)} ≥ 1 + , i.e., P outputs the correct inner product x · r (mod ) with a probability which is better (by ) than a random guess. The bias of an -predictor P is the quantity E ω −k | k ← E (P) . If P runs in time t and has bias at least , we say that P is (t, )-biased. A function family (F, X ) that admits a (t, )-biased -predictor is called (t, , )-biased.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 proceeds in two steps. In the first step (Lemma 3.4) we show that any predictor for K can be efficiently transformed into an inverter for K. This step uses Fourier analysis and holds true for any (not necessarily knapsack) function family with domain [X ] ⊆ Z m . In the second step (Proposition 3.9), we prove that if there exists a distinguisher for K, but no distinguisher for K d for small d, then there exists a predictor for K. This step is specific to knapsack families and depends on both the underlying group G and the distribution X . The two steps combined yield Theorem 3.1. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are devoted to each step of the reduction.
From One-wayness to Unpredictability
Proving that predictability implies invertibility is not specific to knapsack families. Rather, it holds for any function family (F, X ) with [X ] ⊆ Z m . The proof uses the SFT algorithm from Theorem 2.6 to learn the heavy Fourier coefficients of a function. We remark that the learning takes place over the group H = Z m , which is unrelated to the group G of our knapsack function family. Lemma 3.4 provides sufficient conditions under which predictability implies invertibility.
Lemma 3.4. Let (F, X ) be a function family with
Proof. Let P be a (t, )-biased -predictor for F. We use P to define an inverter I that on input (f, f (x)) tries to recover x using the SFT algorithm from Theorem 2.6. In order to run SFT , the inverter I needs to provide answers to the queries r ∈ Z m made by SFT . The queries are answered invoking P on an appropriate input (to be defined). The goal is to present SFT with an oracle/function h : Z m → C which is highly correlated with the character χ x , so that SFT will include x in the list of heavy Fourier coefficients. Details follow.
The inverter I takes as input a function f ← U(F ) and a value y = f (x); it then picks a random string coins and runs algorithm SFT (from Theorem 2.6) with τ = . For every query r ∈ Z m issued by SFT , I
runs P on input (f, f (x), r; coins) and returns ω P(f,f (x),r;coins) ∈ T to SFT , where ω = e 2πi/ . Notice that the same random string coins is used for all queries, so that the queries of SFT are answered according to a deterministic function h f,f (x),coins (r) = ω P(f,f (x),r;coins)
from Z m to C parametrized by f, f (x) and coins. Let L = {x 1 , . . . , x |L| } ⊆ Z m be the (candidate) We now analyze the success probability of I. Clearly Pr{f (I(f, f (x))) = f (x)} ≥ Pr{x ∈ L}. In order to bound Pr{x ∈ L}, we consider the Fourier transform of the function h used to answer the queries of SFT , and compute the Fourier coefficient corresponding to x:
Averaging over f ← U(F ), f (x) and coins we get
Notice that this is the (complex) bias of the predictor. So, by Jensen's inequality (
This proves that the expected magnitude of the Fourier coefficient h f,f (x),coins (x) is at least . By Markov's inequality, Pr f,f (x),coins {| h f,f (x),coins (x)| ≥ 2 } ≥ 2 . So, with probability at least /2 (over f ← U(F ), x ← X and coins) x is a 2 4 -heavy Fourier coefficient of h f,f (x),coins , and it will be included in L with probability at least Pr{f (I(f, f (x))) = f (x)} ≥ ( /2) · (2/3) = /3. Finally, the running time of the inverter is bounded by the running time of SFT times the running time of the predictor. Since h f,f (x),coins ∞ = 1, the running time of SFT is bounded by poly(n, log , 1/ ) (see Theorem 2.6) and hence the overall time of the inverter is poly(n, log , 1/ ) · t.
The previous lemma uses the technical notion of bias to quantify the quality of a prediction algorithm. The following lemma shows that for the special case of a prime , it is enough to bound the success probability of the predictor. Proof. Let P be the predictor that takes as input f, f (x) and r ∈ Z m p and tries to predict x · r (mod p) as follows: pick y ← U(Z * p ), run z ← P(f, f (x), yr), and return z/y. For any k, we have
where t = yr has the same distribution as r. Using the accuracy bound, for k = 0 we immediately get
For k = 0, since y is distributed uniformly at random over Z *
Using these expressions and the identity p−1 k=0 ω −k p = 0, the bias of P is easily computed as
Finally P runs in essentially the same time as P.
Combining the previous two lemmas, we recover as a special case the results of [18, 19] for learning linear functions over a field given query access to a noisy version of the function.
Corollary 3.6. Let (F, X ) be a function family with [X ] ⊆ [s]
m ⊂ Z m , and p a prime such that p ≥ s. If there exists a (t, )-accurate p-predictor for (F, X ), then (F, X ) is (poly(n, log p, 1/ ) · t, 3 )-invertible.
Proof. Easily follows from Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5.
From Unpredictability to Pseudorandomness
In this section we prove that, for knapsack function families, unpredictability implies pseudorandomness. In other words, we show that, under certain conditions, a distinguisher D for K = K(G, X ) with noticeable distinguishing advantage can be turned into a predictor for K with noticeable bias. At a high level, the predictor works as follows: on input a modulus , function g ∈ G m , y = g · x ∈ G and r ∈ Z m , it first makes a guess for the inner product x · r mod ; it then uses that guess to modify the knapsack instance (g, y), and finally invokes the distinguisher D on the modified instance (g , y ). The output of D is used to determine whether the initial guess was correct or not. The same technique was used by Impagliazzo and Naor in [22] . However, in the restricted subset-sum setting considered in [22] , the reduction is rather straightforward: if the guess for x · r is correct, then the modified knapsack instance (g , y ) is distributed according to F(K), whereas if the guess is wrong, the distribution of (g , y ) is (statistically close to) uniform. But these are exactly the two distributions that D can tell apart and therefore a noticeable distinguishing advantage translates directly into an accurate/biased predictor.
When considering general abelian groups and distributions X with [X ] ⊆ {0, 1} m , several technical difficulties arise. Unlike [22] , if the guess for x · r is wrong, then the distribution of (g , y ) can be statistically far from uniform. In fact, (g , y ) can be distributed according to F d (K) for any divisor d of the group exponent M G . Notice that for d = 1 and d = M G we get the two "extreme" distributions
can also arise. Depending on the order and structure of the underlying group, and the output distribution of the distinguisher D on the various auxiliary distributions F d (K), the technical details of the reduction differ significantly. As a warm-up, we first present a weak form of our main Theorem. m and s = poly(n). If K is (t, δ)-distinguishable from uniform for some noticeable δ, but
2 , then for any prime p with s ≤ p < 2s = poly(n), K is (O(t + m), , p)-biased for some noticeable 7 .
Proof. Let D be a (t, δ)-distinguisher, and define
2 ). Let p be any prime between s and 2s. The predictor P is shown as Algorithm 1. Intuitively, the predictor tries to guess the inner product x · r over the integers. If the guess c is correct, the predictor invokes the distinguisher on input
2) is pseudorandom, so D will behave as if it had been invoked on the uniform distribution F 1 (K). So, the distinguisher D will determine (with advantage δ − negl(n)) if the guess c was correct, and if not, the predictor P will output a guess other than c.
We show that P is an -accurate p-predictor for some nonnegligible . The Proposition then follows directly from Lemma 3.5. Let c = x · r = A · p + v (0 ≤ v < p) be the inner product x · r over the integers. P is trying to predict v = c (mod p). The input to the distinguisher D (line 4, Algorithm 1) is (ḡ, R) where − c) . So, the probability that D outputs 1 is by definition β gcd G (c −c) .
Run
.) The probability that P guesses correctly the inner product x · r (mod p) is given by
Conditioning on the output of D, we get that for every d,
where (10) and simplifying, we obtain
This proves that the p-predictor is -accurate for ≥ δ/(m(s − 1)p) − negl(n) ≥ δ/(2ms 2 ). Since p is a prime, by Lemma 3.5, there is also an -biased predictor with essentially the same running time O(m + t) as P.
Proposition 3.7 already gives search-to-decision reductions for some interesting families K, but it requires (as an assumption) the pseudorandomness of K d = K(G d , X ) for a larger range of values of d than as specified in Theorem 3.1. The following lemma plays a crucial role in the proof of Proposition 3.9, which extends Proposition 3.7 to hold under the assumptions in the theorem.
Proof.
* )-biased for some noticeable and polynomially bounded d * ≥ s.
Proof. In order to relax the condition for pseudorandomness of K d from any d ≤ 2ms 2 to any d < s, we need to overcome two major technical difficulties. First, guessing the inner product x · r over the integers, as done in [22] and Proposition 3.7, is unlikely to work for the following reason: A correct guess for x · r produces indeed the distribution F(K) = F M G (K) as input to the distinguisher as desired; however, a wrong guess produces F d (K) for some d smaller than 2ms 2 but possibly larger than s. In that case, we have no guarantee that the distinguishing advantage between F M G (K) and F d (K) (and therefore the predicting advantage of P) is noticeable. We overcome this difficulty by having P guess x · r (mod d) (instead of over the integers) for some divisor
Notice here that d might be composite and hence a predictor that guesses x · r (mod d) with probability larger than 1/d + 1/poly(n) does not necessarily imply an inverter with noticeable success probability (recall that the results of [19] hold over fields). Here is where the power of Lemma 3.4 and Fourier analysis come into the play. What we actually show, is that there exists a (possibly composite) d * and an associated d * -predictor that has bias for some noticeable . Details follow. We adopt the notation from proof of Proposition 3.7. Namely for a (t, δ)-distinguisher D we define β d = Pr{D(F d (K)) = 1}. In addition, for brevity, we often write a ≡ c b instead of a ≡ b (mod c) and define δ ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
By assumption,
We can further assume that there existsd with s ≤d ≤ 2ms 2 = poly(n) such that βd −β 1 =δ for some noticeableδ (otherwise the proof follows directly from Proposition 3.7). Let d * be the smallest divisor ofd such that
* has the following two useful properties: (a) d * ≥ s. This is true because
We will use these properties to construct a d * -predictor P for K. P is shown as Algorithm 2. In the remaining of the proof we analyze the error distribution E d * (P) of P and prove that P has noticeable bias.
be the inner product of x · r over the integers. The input to the distinguisher D (line 4, Algorithm 2) is (ḡ, R) where
Notice that c is the initial attempt (line 1) of P to guess x · r (mod d * ) while v is the actual value of 
. The error distribution of P is given by the probabilities Pr{guess
Conditioning on the events C j , we get
If we further condition on whether D outputs 1 or 0, it is not hard to see that (recall δ kj = 1 iff k = j)
Replacing in (12) gives
Using this and the fact that
Next we bound (g 1 , . . . , g m ) and y where g i = (g i , b i ) and y = (py, 0). Notice that (g , y ) is distributed according to F(K(G , X )), exactly as required by I . So, the inverter I will output a preimage x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) of y with probability . Notice also that if (x 1 , . . . , x m ) is in the support of the input distribution [X ], then p divides (x 1 , . . . , x m ). If this is the case, I outputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) , where x i = x i /p for i = 1, . . . , m. Since gcd(p, M G ) = 1, multiplication by p is an invertible function from G to G. In particular, if the inverter I is successful, then g I (g , y ) = y implies gI(g, y) = y, and the I is successful too. This proves that I is a (t, )-inverter for t ≈ t .
Specific Groups and Input Distributions
We start with groups G whose order does not contain any factors that are within the maximum value the input can take. In this case one-wayness implies pseudorandomness for any input distribution. m ), the connection between onewayness and pseudorandomness is more subtle. In that case, Lemma 4.1 tells us that in order to prove search-to-decision reductions, the group and input distribution need to be restricted somehow. Still, our main theorem can be used to prove search-to-decision reductions for a wide range of groups and input distributions. In the rest of this section we give a few representative examples, focusing on vector groups G = Z k q both for simplifying the exposition and because these groups are most interesting from a cryptographic viewpoint (see Section 4.2).
For a vector group G = Z k q consider the folded knapsack function
. By Theorem 3.1, proving pseudorandomness of K(G, X ) reduces to proving that the folded families K d are pseudorandom for all d < s with d | q. In fact, below we prove that in many interesting settings the function families K d are statistically random. Lemma 4.3 provides sufficient conditions for pseudorandomness expressed in terms of the statistical properties of X and the factorization of q: for every "small" divisor d of q, the d-folded distribution X d = {x mod d | x ← X } should have collision probability much smaller than the inverse of the order of the quotient group
For that, we can directly apply Lemma 2.3 with
where we used the hypothesis that Col Xd = negl(n)/d k for alld | q with 1 <d < s and the fact that d has at most d < s = poly(n) divisorsd.
Below we give 2 natural families of distributions which have small collision probability when folded, and thereby result in pseudorandom knapsack families. 
Uniformly

Applications to LWE
In this section, we show how our results for knapsack functions imply similar search-to-decision reductions for the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem with the interesting feature of being sample-preserving. Following common notational conventions from the existing LWE literature, we use n for the length of the secret vector s, m for the number of samples, q for the modulus and χ for the error distribution. Let n, m, q be positive integers and χ a distribution over Z q . For any q, n ∈ Z, s ∈ Z n q , and χ, define the distribution
We recall that the LWE problem with parameters n, m, q and χ is the problem of recovering s given m samples from distribution A s,χ . In the decisional version of LWE (DLWE), one is given m samples drawn independently at random either from A s,χ (for some secret s) or from U(Z n q × Z q ). The goal is to tell the two distributions apart with noticeable probability.
We are interested in reductions from LWE to DLWE that preserve all the parameters n, m, q, χ, including the number of samples m. Sample-preserving reductions are more naturally described using matrix notation for the LWE problem. Given a collection of m LWE samples (a i , b i ) ← A s,χ , we can combine them in a matrix A having the vectors a i as rows, and a column vector b with entries equal to b i . That is, b = As + e where e ← χ m . With this notation, we want to prove that any algorithm that distinguishes (A, As + e) from U(Z m×n q × Z m q ) can be used to recover the secret s. Notice that once the secret s has been recovered, one can also recover the error vector e = b − As. So, we can equivalently define LWE as the problem of recovering both s and e from A and As + e. This is exactly the problem of inverting the following function family.
Definition 4.7. Let n, m, q be positive integers and χ a probability distribution over Z q . Let LWE(n, m, q, χ) be the function family (F, X ) where X = {(s, e) | s ← U(Z n q ), e ← χ m }, and F is the set of functions f A indexed by A ∈ Z m×n q and defined as f A (s, e) = As + e.
Similarly, the decision version of LWE is precisely the problem of distinguishing F(LWE(n, m, q, χ)) from the uniform distribution U(Z m×n q × Z m q ). However, LWE(n, m, q, χ) is not a knapsack function family. In order to apply the results from Section 3, we exploit the duality between the LWE problem and an associated knapsack function family described in the following lemmas. Since duality between LWE and knapsack functions has been noticed before in the literature [42, 30, 26] , here we only sketch the proofs of the lemmas.
Lemma 4.8. For any 13 n, m ≥ n + ω(log n), q and χ, there is a polynomial time reduction from the problem of inverting LWE(n, m, q, χ) with probability , to the problem of inverting K(Z m−n q , χ m ) with probability = + negl(n).
Proof Sketch. The transformation from the LWE problem into an equivalent knapsack problem requires that the matrix A be nonsingular, i.e., the rows of A generate Z n q . When A ← U(Z m×n q ), this is true except with probability at most 1/p m−n−1 , where p is the smallest prime factor of q. So, for m ≥ n + ω(log n), Pr{A is singular} = negl(n). We can therefore assume A has been chosen at random, but conditioned on being nonsingular.
Consider now the set of all vectors g ∈ Z m q such that gA = 0 (mod q). Under the assumption that A is nonsingular, this set is generated by the rows of a matrix G ∈ Z (m−n)×m q that can be efficiently computed from A using linear algebra. We can further randomize G by left-multiplying it by a random unimodular matrix U ∈ Z (m−n)×(m−n) q . Finally, if A is chosen at random among all nonsingular matrices, then this randomized G is also distributed uniformly at random among all matrices whose columns generate Z m−n q . As before, the distribution of G is within negligible statistical distance from U(Z (m−n)×m q ), so we can treat the columns of G as random elements from the vector group G = Z m−n q . Finally, we set c = Gb = GAs + Ge = Ge, so the distribution (G, c) is statistically close to a random instance of the knapsack problem with group G = Z m−n q and input distributed according to the error distribution χ m .
Lemma 4.9. For any n, m ≥ n + ω(log n), q and χ, there is a polynomial time reduction from the problem of distinguishing F(K(Z m−n q , χ m )) from uniform with advantage to the problem of distinguishing F(LWE(n, m, q, χ)) from uniform with advantage = + negl(n).
Proof Sketch. The distinguisher for the knapsack function is obtained similarly, transforming the knapsack instance into a corresponding LWE one. This transformation essentially reverses the steps taken to transform LWE into knapsack. We start from a pair (G, c). As before, we can assume without loss of generality (up to negligible statistical error) that the columns of G generate Z m−n q . Next, by linear algebra, we compute a matrix A ∈ Z m×n q whose columns generate the set of vectors a ∈ Z m q such that Ga = 0 (mod q). As before, we can randomize A by right-multiplying it by a random unimodular matrix U ∈ Z n×n q to obtain A . We also map c to A s + r where s ← U(Z n q ) and r is an arbitrary solution to the equation Gr = c. It can be checked that this transformation maps the knapsack distribution (G, c = Ge) to the LWE distribution (A , A s + e) (with uniformly random s), when G and A are chosen at random subject to the constraint that they are nonsingular. The transformation also maps the uniform distribution to a (statistically close to) uniform distribution. So, by feeding (A , A s + e) into an LWE distinguisher, we get a distinguisher for the knapsack function with essentially the same (up to negligible terms, due to nonsingular matrices) distinguishing advantage of the LWE distinguisher.
We remark that reductions exist also in the directions opposite to those described in Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.9, but this is all we need here.
Sample-preserving reductions for LWE, i.e., reductions from the problem of inverting LWE(n, m, q, χ) to the problem of distinguishing F(LWE(n, m, q, χ)) from uniform, are immediately obtained combining the reductions from Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.9 with the results from Section 3 on K(Z m−n q , χ m ). Similarly to the knapsack case, the reductions do not hold unconditionally; rather they hold for specific, yet very broad, moduli q and error distributions χ. Below we provide some examples of such moduli q and distributions χ. Throughout, it is assumed that m ≥ n + ω(log n). (i) Binary modulus q = 2 and any error distribution χ over {0, 1}.
(ii) Prime modulus q = poly(n) and any error distribution χ over Z q .
(iii) Prime power modulus q = p e for prime p = poly(n), and χ such that [χ] ⊆ {−(p − 1)/2, . . . , (p − 1)/2}.
(iv) Prime power modulus q = p e where χ is the uniform distribution over Z p i for some i < e such that p i = poly(n).
Proof. The proof for all cases follows easily by combining Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9 with the results for bounded knapsack families from Section 4.1. In particular cases (i), (ii) and (iii) are direct applications of Lemma 4.2 whereas case (iv) is immediate from Corollary 4.5.
Remark 4.11. Case (i) from Proposition 4.10 provides a sample-preserving search-to-decision reduction for the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. Such a reduction was already given in [7] . In contrast, other reductions appearing in the literature [10, 23] do not preserve the number of samples. Using q = poly(n) as in case (ii) and Gaussian error distribution χ over Z q is typical in LWE-based cryptographic applications. In fact, these parameters were used in the first LWE-based semantically secure scheme by Regev [38] who also presented a (non sample-preserving) search-to-decision reduction. Case (iii) provides a sample-preserving version of the search-to-decision reduction proved in [6] . Finally, the search-to-decision reduction for LWE with modulus and noise distribution as in case (iv) appears to be new; no such (even non-sample-preserving) reduction has previously appeared in the literature. Setting q = 2 and χ to be the uniform distribution over Z 2 for some = O(log n) seems very appealing since arithmetic modulo 2 and sampling over uniform distributions can be implemented very efficiently in practice.
Open Problems
Our work leaves many interesting open questions. To start with, sample-preserving search-to-decision reductions for LWE with bounded noise as considered in this work, don't seem to extend to the unbounded noise regime, i.e. when each coefficient e i of the error vector e of LWE is drawn from a set with superpolynomial size. We note that such search-to-decision reductions are known [35] but are not sample-preserving. These reductions rely heavily on a Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT) approach: using a perfect 14 distinguisher, they first learn the secret modulo p i with overwhelming success probability for each polynomially bounded prime factor p i of the modulus q; they then use the CRT to recover the entire secret. In sample-preserving reductions, where only an imperfect distinguisher is available, learning the secret modulo p i can be performed in a much looser, list-decoding sense: the projection of the secret modulo p i is included in the corresponding lists L i but among possibly many other elements. And the only way to check which of the list elements corresponds to the actual projection of the secret modulo p i seems to be first forming the entire secret using CRT and then verifying that the result is the LWE secret. Thus, one has to solve a superpolynomial number of CRT instances before recovering the correct value of the secret. It would be nice to extend the list-decoding approach to work even in that case.
As an additional motivation, we mention that extending our sample-preserving reductions to the unbounded error setting would pave the road to similar results for the Ring LWE (R-LWE) problem [28] . R-LWE is an algebraic variant of LWE that leads to much more efficient constructions than standard LWE while still enjoying strong security guarantees. Much like LWE with unbounded noise, existing search-todecision reductions [28] decompose the secret (which is an element from a ring R) modulo q i where the q i s are prime ideal factors.
Our work also highlights the importance of understanding the hardness of LWE under various noise distributions. Current hardness proofs for search LWE [38] based on worst-case lattice problems rely on the noise following a Gaussian distribution. Can lattice-based hardness results for search LWE be extended to noise distributions other than Gaussian? Can we show similar lattice-based hardness results if the noise is distributed uniformly at random modulo 2 i ? The latter case is very attractive from a practical viewpoint since arithmetic modulo powers of 2 and sampling from uniform distributions can be implemented very efficiently.
